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Abstract  
 
This study examines how business networking and commitment to local market affect MNCs. 
speed of business entry in an emerging market. We look at relationship between networking, 
commitment and performance of entry process into Chinese automotive industry by 
multinationals from three different countries; USA, Europe and Korea. Data is collected 
through in-depth interviews and through secondary sources related to the entry process of 
these cases. The experiences of three MNCs illustrate that entry strategy and speed of entry 
are influenced by business networking between MNCs and the key business and socio-
political actors. Our cases also show that networking tend to generate multi-dimensional 
effects on MNCs. speed of market entry.  
 
Keywords: Speed of internationalization; Networks; Entry strategy; Automobile industry; 
China  
 
 
  
Introduction  
 
In the international business (IB) literature, much research has focused on networking in the 
developed economies during the process of foreign market entry (Elg, Ghauri, and 
Tarnovskaya 2008; Kontinen and Ojala 2010; Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009). In recent 
years, there have been growing interests among researchers on the impact of networking in 
emerging markets (Luo and Tung, 2007; Santos and Ruffin, 2010). Emerging markets are 
believed to posses environmental characteristics different from those in advanced economies. 
For example, the market institutions are not well developed and business-government 
relationship is excessively inter-twined (Khanna, Bigley, D.Aunno, Ring, 2005; Palepu and 
Khanna, 1997). It is also considered that multinationals from emerging markets are better 
equipped to handle networking and entry process in other emerging markets (Palepu and 
Khanna, 1997).  
 
Business networking is defined as formation of inter-firm relationship with the key business 
actors (Anderson, Håkansson, and Johanson, 1994). Since internationalization process model 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), there has been a large body of literature in the foreign market 
entry and business networking of multinational corporations (MNCs); most studies have 
demonstrated that resource commitment, learning, and trust in the foreign markets is 
facilitated by developing relationships with the local business actors, helping MNCs settle 
down in the host markets (Zaheer, 1995; Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010). 
Nevertheless, it still remains unclear that whether networking with the local actors influences 
the speed of entry and the internationalization process as a whole or not.  
 
Previous studies (Hadjikhani, Lee, and Ghauri, 2008; Ghauri, Elg and Tarnovskaya, 2008) 
argue that the socio-political context may be one of the answers that explains speed variations 
in entry process for MNCs in foreign markets. While the entry success of MNCs is 
reasonably dependent upon the business itself and other contexts (Lee and Hadjikhani, 2005), 
the existing studies in business networks and relationships have rarely paid attention to 
MNCs. speed of foreign market entry under specific socio-political environments such as the 
Chinese automobile industry where the local partners are often the host government. 
Therefore, this paper addresses a fundamental question in the area of IB research, why there 
are variations in the speed of MNCs’ market entry into emerging markets and whether it is 
influenced by networking capabilities/activities of multinationals or not?  
 
Relationships have both static and dynamic nature; characteristics of relationship between 
MNCs and their partners, suppliers, and socio-political organizations tend to determine 
MNCs. market position (Ghauri and Holstius, 1996; Welch and Wilkinson, 2004). At the 
same time, these relations evolve over time. In this process, successful relational management 
of MNCs in international market eventually hinges upon the elements such as learning and 
resource commitments (Hadjikhani et al, 2008; Isobe, Makino, Montgomery, 2000). In our 
study, we examine whether networking influences the process of MNCs, when they enter the 
Chinese automobile market or not?  
 
Early entry provides MNCs with an opportunity of "first-mover advantage" (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1998) at the same time, firms that entered earlier tend to show low survival 
likelihood due to more damages from cultural conflicts and misunderstanding of partner 
organization (Isobe et al, 2000).  
 
In this paper, the purpose of study is to investigate how MNCs with different structures and 
strategies, network with the key local actors while entering a foreign market. This research 
contributes to the understanding of the link between the speed of internationalization process 
and networking in two significant ways; first, the research presented here serves as a fair 
answer to the question that why some MNCs are able to enter foreign markets quickly and 
without problems; second, whether MNCs coming from similar environmental and 
institutional settings (emerging market firms entering other emerging markets) are in a better 
position to achieve this speed or not?  
 
The Theoretical Framework and the Previous Research  
 
Internationalization, Learning and Commitment  
 
Among several perspectives which approach internationalization process, the paper by 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) perhaps was the first to mention mechanism of networking 
behavior of MNCs in the process of internationalization. The essence of this model is that 
firms tend to go global gradually over time and the increasing experiences in international 
markets drive MNCs to augment investments by committing more resources in the hosting 
markets and in the subsequent entries.  
 
The model assumes gradual learning in internationalization as well as a unilateral process 
from a MNCs' entry in the host market. However, the recent findings suggest that the 
internationalization may be based on rapid and two-way (interactive) learning (Hedlund and 
Kverneland, 1984; Hadjikhani et al, 2008). In addition, turbulence in the market environment 
where the internationalizing firms are based, or technological advancement have emerged to 
determine the decision and the performance of MNCs. internationalization (Turnbull, 1987; 
Makhija, 1993).  
 
Internationalization may be viewed as a process in which MNCs expand their organizational 
network into another country. Foreign market entry is an initial step of expanding business 
networks (Coviello and Munro, 1997; McDougall, Shane, and Oviatt, 1994). During the 
process of foreign market entry, firms tend to act within their existing business network, so 
that characteristics of the existing network affect the new entries to the foreign market 
(Blomstermo and Sharma, 2001; Chen and Chen, 1998). Leaning and commitment shown by 
the MNCs affect interaction between new entrants and the local business actors and produce 
different networking patterns layering on the existing network (Hadjikhani et al, 2008).  
 
Learning and commitment do not only consist of a firm.s relational idiosyncrasy but also 
determine the nature of MNCs' business networking after foreign market entry. Because of 
less developed market institutions, relationship with socio-political actors, particularly with 
government, frequently handles the level so that MNCs can cope with institutional 
uncertainties (Lee and Hadjikhani, 2005). The networking with socio-political actors shape 
perception and attitude of a government in an emerging market towards the new MNC.  
 
Networking significantly reduces agency costs that may incur during foreign market entry 
because it shows the goal and attitude of an entrant to a partner firm as well as to the host 
government (Aulakh, Kotabe, and Sahay, 1996). When firms aim to penetrate into a new 
market, they need to invest a large amount of resources into a variety of relationships. 
Learning, on the other hand, takes place in multiple areas; for example, locational learning 
helps entrants better understand importance of establishing a business base in the particular 
foreign market and reaping locational benefits offered by the country market. Thus, the 
existence of geographic learning leads to sequential entries in the same geographic area.  
 
As commitment and learning by a firm increase, its inter-firm relationships become quality-
oriented rather than cost-oriented (Sobrero and Roberts, 1996), long-term oriented (resource-
building) rather than short-term oriented (resource-exchange), or exploration-oriented rather 
than exploitation-oriented. Learning enables an entrant to be aware of foreignness and 
become adapt to new business environments in order to fill in the gap between an entrant and 
the host country/partner.  
 
 
 
Networking and the speed of Foreign Market Entry  
 
The fundamental logic in our study is that networking affects the levels of learning and 
commitment to the foreign market, which then differentiates speed of market entry into the 
market. In terms of business networking, foreign market entry is viewed as the process by 
which firms establish themselves in foreign markets over long time periods and not just the 
characteristics of the entry decision and modes of entry (Johanson and Vahlne, 2010; 
Axelsson and Johanson, 1992). Recent studies have found that firms enter foreign markets as 
a network at a certain point of time, which is labeled as "pre-clusterization."(Hatani, 2009; 
Buckley and Horn, 2009). Pre-clusterization is defined as an advanced form of network-based 
foreign entry, where firms in a business group enter an emerging market and begin to cluster 
in the location that the core firm targets (Hatani, 2009).  
 
MNCs who adopt pre-clusterization strategy connect the suppliers and affiliates together in 
order to fulfill specific roles within the boundary of firm, and to facilitate achievement of 
their common goals (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). The pre-clustered MNCs may create a 
competitive advantage by applying the tacit knowledge they have developed (Kogut and 
Zander, 1995). Specifically for early entrants, pre-clusterization is the best entry mode and is 
often imitated by late entrants (Guillen, 2003).  
 
Yet it is also argued that this model is valid only when a firm is at early stage of 
internationalization, lacking sufficient knowledge about the foreign market (Forsgren, 2008; 
Forsgren, 1989). Recent studies have found that pre-clusterization strategy helps MNCs tailor 
their entry strategies for host countries with foresight to ensure the best outcome (Delios and 
Henisz, 2000). An early mover, by definition, has a quasi-monopoly advantage before 
competition begins and is in a position to capture higher economic rents than would be 
possible in a competitive market place (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). To apply this 
view to the context of business networking, the early entrant may gain or maintain 
advantages in establishing network relationships with local actors by having more 
opportunities of acquiring scarce assets locally available and of developing unique local 
buyer and production network (Isobe et al, 2000).  
 
There are several reasons why networking affects the speed of entry by MNCs in a foreign 
market, particularly in emerging markets. First, early entrant MNCs can have more time for 
local adaptation (Vahlne, Ivarsson, and Johanson 2010). As the level of MNCs. localization 
increases and MNCs are likely to overcome liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), firms start 
the process of building commitments and trust with local actors. Accordingly, it appears that 
late entrants find themselves situated in an environment where they cannot concentrate on 
building relationships and trust with local actors(Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri, 2003).  
 From the stance of the local business actors in a host market, they may build some preference 
that favors the early entrant as they have more time to get familiar with and understand the 
early entrant. Once business networking between an early entrant MNC and local business 
actors is formed, the local business actors may develop switching costs in the business 
relationship, just like customers find it hard to change to other brands introduced later to the 
market.  
 
The previous studies on MNCs' entries in China have implied that advantages of early entry 
for performance may be very strong and consistent, although no study has empirically 
examined the causal link. Local governments in China often treat early foreign investors 
more nicely (Isobe et al, 2000; Choi, Beamish, and Sharp, 2000). Early entrant MNCs thus 
may develop business networking more easily and thus settle in the new market faster than 
the late entrants.  
 
Based on these earlier studies, we present a conceptual model (Figure 1). Our model deals 
with three distinct parts; networking, learning and commitment and performance. We use 
network variables; actors, activities and resources, presenting the establishment of 
relationships with different actors in the market, the activities performed and resources spent 
to establish these relationships as suggested by several scholars (Hadjikhani et al. 2008, Elg 
et al. 2008, Håkansson and Johanson 2002). Secondly , our model suggests that networking 
will allow the firm to learn more about the particular market as regard to locational users , 
such as suppliers, customers and competitors, as well as it will allow the firm to learn and 
handle the institutional environment of the market. This will encourage the firm to be more 
committed and in the same way will encourage local actors to be more committed to the firm 
(Isobe et al., 2000; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Weleh and Wilkinsopn, 2004; Vahlne 
et al, 2010).  
 
Finally, our model suggests that the networking and the resulting learning and commitment 
will lead to a speedy and successful market entry in the new market (Schwen and Kabst, 
2009; Lee and Hadjikhani, 2005).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 
 
Method  
 
Research setting  
 
Considering our research question, our research design in exploratory and qualitative as we 
are trying to answer “how” and “why” questions and are looking for “thick” in-depth insights 
(Yin 2003, Ghauri and Gronhang 2010). Our research setting is the automobile industry in 
China. This setting offers several advantages when examining the relationship between 
internationalization process and speed of market entry. In the recent decade when the global 
automobile industry suffered from profit decline, the Chinese automobile market has shown a 
remarkable growth. It is one of the industries in China that opened the door to foreign 
investors in the early 1980s and have actively attracted foreign direct investment. As the 
Chinese economy still rapidly grew, the demand for transportation vehicles increased 
enormously, which gave sufficient incentives to foreign automakers for the Chinese market 
entry.  
 
The unique research setting also made the varying speed of networking and market entry 
more observable. From the beginning of market opening in the automobile industry formation 
of international joint venture was actively promoted by the Chinese government for the 
purpose of acquiring advanced automobile technologies. All foreign automakers were 
allowed to operate in China only in a form of joint venture with the Chinese domestic firms. 
The maximum share of ownership for a foreign automaker in the joint venture was 50 
percent. Therefore, there were two groups of players in the Chinese automobile market in 
general; the Chinese automakers and the international joint ventures (IJV). A majority of the 
Chinese automakers have been state-owned and been operating in affiliation with local 
governments. Top three Chinese automakers by production volume are First Auto Works 
(FAW), Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation (SAIC), and Dongfeng Automotive 
Group (Dongfeng). The businesses of these three firms are administered in separate regions 
(locations) where the local characteristics in business practice itself and business-government 
relations are substantially different (Kwak, Min, Lee, 2010).  
 
Data collection  
 
In order to understand the dynamics of networking and its impact on the internationalization 
process in the Chinese automobile market, we chose PSA-Citroen-Peugeot (Citroen), 
Hyundai Motors (HM), and General Motors (GM). In the following section, the empirical 
facts that we obtained consists of both the primary and secondary data. Citroen, a renowned 
French automobile manufacturer, entered the Chinese market in the early 1980s, forming a 
joint venture with Dongfeng Group (DF). HM entered China in alliance with Beijing 
Automotive Industry Corporation(BAIC ). GM entered through collaboration with Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC)-GM. Entry mode of Citroen, HM, and GM was 
joint venture, with ownership of 50%, 50%, and 49%, respectively.  
 
The case study method is chosen as it will enable us to understand the dynamic process of 
networking and internationalization in a complex setting (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The cases reported here cover the period from 1983 to 2009, and we focus 
on the most dynamic developments that occurred from market entry and subsequent 
internationalization process for several years. It is important to study the processes over a 
long period of time, in order to analyze and understand networking, internationalization 
process and speed of internationalization (Ghauri and Firth 2009).  
 
Our data collection took place between March, 2008 to April 2010 through four rounds of 
field trips to Beijing and Shanghai where the headquarters of our sample cases are located. 
During our interviews, we identified and interviewed general managers responsible for 
strategic planning and the R&D managers. Interviews were administered in a semi-structured 
format, conditional upon data confidentiality and no disclosure of respondent identity. All 
respondents have been working for the case firms since 1983, and have been engaged in 
preparing and establishing relationships for the company before as well as after the time 
covered by this study. They have extensive personal experience of business networking at the 
firm level.  
 
When collecting information, we often encountered a critical problem related to the topic of 
the research. Firms tended to be reluctant to provide specific information about their 
businesses or to have ball-park figures. Therefore, it was necessary for us to continue 
communication through e-mails and phone calls after field research. In addition, brochures 
and information released by these firms in the home countries and in host country (China), as 
well as industry statistical yearbooks provided the secondary sources of data. This 
supplemented the open-ended discussion in which the interviewers explored a set of pre-
determined topics in which ever order appeared natural (Ghauri and Firth, 2009). It was hard 
to find some way of discreetly checking that all the topics were covered both by the key local 
business actors and the interviewees at MNCs. The interviews took 120-180 minutes and 
were tape-recorded, transcribed, and verified with the relevant respondents. The information 
collected was coded and categorized for the purpose of data reduction and analysis as 
suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Ghauri (2004).  
 
Table 1 presents basic information of our case firms. The sample firms do not reflect 
population characteristics but provide sufficient representation of the industry and the market. 
The data is analyzed through pattern matching and through systematic case comparison 
(Ghauri, 2004). The origins of case companies are France, United States, and Korea. They 
differ in terms of sales growth rate, year of initial contact with the Chinese automobile 
market, year of IJV establishment, efforts to make IJV an independent brand (thus MNCs' 
local strategic orientation), and the degree of IJV R&D for model development. This means 
that we have enough similarities (automotive IJVs in China) and variations (see table 1) to do 
a trust worthy comparison to draw conclusions (Sinkovics, Penz&Ghauri 2008).  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Findings  
 
A general view is that the central government in China is a main actor and heavily controls 
the industry. It issues business licenses, allocates newly entering MNCs to the matching 
regions, designs industrial policies, and conducts national merger projects among the Chinese 
automakers. The automakers in China are based in specific locations, representing a single 
province or city and they work closely with the local business actors. On the other hand, 
industrial policies required by the central government apply, particularly to MNCs, therefore, 
the internationalization process reflects results of the locational learning about the local 
context where MNCs are to operate.  
 
A province or municipality (collectively called as a "local government" vis-à-vis central 
government) acts as a business agent. It sometimes conflicts with the central government over 
issues related to self-interest, since an entry of MNC automakers increases employment, 
investments, and tax revenue for a local government. As a result, a Chinese firm forms 
several IJVs with different MNC partners, while MNCs have less than three Chinese IJV 
partners. The local joint ventures of an MNC sometimes compete against each other over 
market share; for example, FAW-VW produces Audi series and SAIC-VW produces 
Volkswagen series, and both IJVs compete in a high-end automobile market.  
 
The local context, interplaying with regionalism, has shaped unique business environments. 
For example, Shanghai (the location of GM China) is characterized as local development 
state, while Beijing (the location of HM China) is portrayed as a laissez-faire government 
(Thun, 2006). Because the way of doing business essentially reflects the local culture, MNCs. 
internationalization process has differed by the geographic location and the factors related to 
networking have determined the speed of entry.  
 
The first step in market entry to China for an MNC automaker was to submit an application 
for joint venture to the central government. The central government then matched up with a 
local government willing to establish IJV and in search of a partner. The MNCs in our study, 
in order to enter the Chinese automobile market, acquired pre-entry learning about the 
Chinese market. Before establishment of IJV with DF in Hubei Province, Citroen China in 
China produced small trucks jointly with Guangzhou Automotive Industrial Corporation 
(GAIC) in 1985. After years of disappointing sales performance, the IJV was sold off to 
Honda, a Japanese automaker. Hyundai Motors (HM) also experienced trials-and-errors. In 
1994, it established an IJV with Dongfeng in Hubei Province for production of commercial 
vehicle but ended up with failure. In 2000, it promoted another IJV with Yueda in Jiangsu 
Province but the pre-entry project was broken up again. General Motors (GM) also had 
similar experiences.GM in 1992 formed an IJV with Jinbei in Liaoning Province to produce 
mini-buses. In 1998, GM established the second IJV with Jinbei to promote Chevrolet Blazer 
sport-utility vehicles and S10 pickup trucks. The IJV, however, suffered from continuous 
losses because the products were not adapted to local consumers and ownership structure was 
too complicated to make decisions efficiently.  
 
After several pre-entry projects, Citroen, HM, and GM established the official IJVs with 
Dongfeng Group (DF) in Hubei province, Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation (BAIC) 
in Beijing, and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation(SAIC) in Shanghai, respectively – 
the Chinese partners different from the pre-entry partners (see Table 2). As GM in the U.S. 
has suffered from low profitability, GM China exerted efforts to make good relationship with 
SAIC, its Chinese partner. GM China thus had a very strong commitment to get localized and 
was eager to manage skillfully the local actors. As a consequence, GM China actively 
executed subsequent IJV formation with assistance of SAIC, its official partner. Unlike other 
IJVs, SAIC-GM rarely experienced significant conflicts between partners, which seems to be 
due to intensive networking by GM. By establishment of PATEC at the beginning of entry, 
the jointly funded R&D center, SAIC-GM was able to participate in the global R&D projects 
and to produce own brands. Although aware that the Chinese partner ultimately intends to 
make own brands, GM China has been assured that two firms will compete over different 
market segments. SAIC-GM has thus shown a high level of commitment in building 
relationship with local business actors. GM China even established IJVs with other local 
governments, for example, IJVs with Liuzhou Municipal government or with First Auto 
Works(FAW) in Changchun Municipal government as Table 2 illustrates. However, the 
sequential entries of GM China did not encounter political tensions with the existing partners, 
thanks to its stronger network relations.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Like GM, the sales of HM China have rapidly increased. Yet the pattern of the dynamic 
networking for HM China looks different from that of GM China. As Table 2 shows, HM 
China did not widen the networking boundary once it formed an IJV with BAIC, except the 
one with Yueya in 2006. In 2005, HM China initiated the second IJV with GAIC for 
production of compact cars, however, upon expiry of contract term in 2008, GAIC terminated 
the IJV, turning to Honda. At our interview, we noted that HM China was strongly controlled 
by the headquarters in Korea. As the frequent visits from the headquarters in Korea 
demonstrate, HM.s China entry was executed as a part of the global operation strategy 
planned by the headquarters in Korea. Therefore, business networking of HM China was also 
deliberately implemented by the headquarters.  
 
Unlike GM China or HM China, Citroen China worked exclusively with DF. Since the IJV 
establishment in 1992, it once had a change in ownership structure: PSA group, the parent of 
Citroen China, began to directly participate in the China business, adding Peugeot China to 
DF-Citroen IJV. Like HM, the businesses of Citroen China was closely monitored and 
administered by its headquarters in France (PSA group). Management of DF-Citroen was 
thus affected by the management orientation of PSA group. When the financial problem of 
DF-Citroen arose in 2003 due to the disappointing sales performance, PSA group in France, 
rather than Citroen China, notified the headquarters of DF that DF-Citroen should promptly 
change production system into customized production. For another example, DF-Citroen had 
a loss of 2.7 billion RMB in 2004 but PSA group still maintained its basic stance that DF-
Citroen continue to purchase production equipment and complete-knock-down (CKD) 
supplies from PSA group. As a result, until the price war completely turned on in the Chinese 
automobile market, the localization ratio of DF-Citroen was as low as 56%. Although the 
localization ratio gradually increased, DF-Citroen still preferred imported production 
equipment and components from PSA group in France to local procurement. As a solution to 
the growing losses, Citroen China formed an alliance in 2007 with Hafei Automotive to 
produce commercial vehicle but the decision was made without discussion with DF. Also, 
pushed by the pressure of technology transfer, Citroen China established CTC(R&D center) 
in Shanghai while DF-Citroen is located in Wuhan. The two events infuriated DF.  
 
Learning and Commitment  
 
In general, the speed at which MNCs expand their business through sequential entries seems 
to differ depending on entry timing and the network relationships. The Chinese managers at 
the selected IJVs told that both the central government and the local governments better 
treated early entrants– those IJVs that were formed in the 1980s – than later entrants. During 
the period, the Chinese automobile industry lacked technology, managerial skills and, more 
importantly, foreign capital. Even the Chinese consumers were not yet ready to purchase 
automobile. The MNCs which entered in the 1980s, accordingly, were perceived by the 
Chinese governments as more beneficial to China. On the other hand, later entrants had to 
show stronger commitment, otherwise, they could not be given favorable consideration from 
the partner firm given the increasingly competitive market.  
 
From the early period on, the Chinese government clearly announced that technology transfer 
was a goal for attracting MNCs into the Chinese automobile market. MNCs. efforts to 
transfer technology have been regarded by the partner firm and by the government as a 
commitment to local contribution in foreign market entry. The attitude of MNCs in relation to 
technology transfer has to a large extent affected the pattern and the speed of market entry in 
the Chinese automobile market.  
 
Over time, the focus of technology transfer (and, accordingly, the governmental criteria to 
evaluate MNCs. local contribution) shifted from production technique to research and 
development (R&D). MNCs were explicitly requested for establishment of local R&D 
centers and for active product development with local resources. The initiative to promote 
local R&D programs was primarily top-down approach; however, on the other hand, the 
MNCs themselves crowded into competitive construction of R&D centers, driven by the 
rivaling MNCs. attempts to leverage technology transfer for gaining more favors from the 
Chinese government (or the partners).  
 
The first business that GM China launched in partnership with SAIC was to establish an 
R&D lab specialized in engineering automobile engines. Partially because of the declining 
businesses in the United States as well as of GM.s independent global governance structure, 
SAIC-GM behaved relatively independent of GM.s interests. For example, SAIC-GM and 
SAIC jointly established an automobile design firm ("Pan-Asia Technical Automotive 
Center: PATAC") and the intellectual property rights for designs developed by PATAC are 
owned by SAIC-GM, as an independent legal entity (see Table 3). As GM China collaborated 
more closely with SAIC, it concentrated more on co-branding for products developed jointly 
by SAIC-GM, and began to build the second R&D center, CAERC.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Regarding HM, even though the time to market has been very short for BAIC-HM due to 
efficient decision-making at headquarters in Korea, BAIC-HM introduced an almost full set 
of product series during the first five years. Nonetheless, HM China was often requested by 
the Chinese press that it construct an R&D center and reduce the role of Hyundai Mobis 
China. The product designs for the automobile models in the Chinese market were 
fundamentally the same as the products in the Korean market. In the earlier stage, the 
common R&D activities of BAICHM were imports of high-end sedans from Korea or minor 
design changes. Over time, BAIC-HM reduced imports and became aware of the importance 
to respond to calls from BAIC for codevelopment.  
 
 
In the earlier time, the product R&D by Citroen China focused on assistance of DF in 
technology licensing from Citroen. Until the Chinese automobile market became very 
competitive with incoming MNC entrants, technology licensing continued to be the core task 
for technology transfer at Citroen China. In 2006, there were 200 employees working at DF-
Citroen R&D lab. The R&D force increased to be 500 personnel in 2010 after CTC was 
established. At our interview, managers at DF appreciated the earlier efforts of Citroen China 
in the process of technology transfer, as DF-Citroen introduced the Elysee series in 2002, 
which DF designed at its own capacity.  
 
At its debut in the Chinese automobile market in 1993, DF-Citroen introduced a model 
currently on sales in the European market. However, due to insufficient knowledge about 
Chinese consumers, the first product ended up with disappointing sales performance, 
although it was the earliest technology transfer from a Western firm to the Chinese 
automobile industry. After the first model, the product models of DF-Citroen were based on 
design changes to the local taste (one-way approach), rather than based on exploration of 
local knowledge (two-way approach). As Table 4 suggests, for a decade DF-Citroen 
produced Fukang series only. In 2002, it finally launched Elysee and from 2006 began 
product diversification. Among the automobile models, Fukang series are no longer 
produced. We have also found at our interview that profitability of C series and Pegaso is 
low.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
After entry in 2002, HM China also introduced a few lines, Sonata, Elantra, Tuscan, and 
Accent series (see Table 5). BAIC-HM has focused only on selected lines and increased their 
production capacity. Unlike DF-Citroen, the products of BAIC-HM do not have a 
discontinued line, which implies that BAIC-HM has been good at product learning, an 
understanding of local- onsumer needs. Perhaps HM China.s less diversified product 
portfolio is attributed to by relatively fewer efforts for local R&D at the HM subsidiary in 
China, as suggested by Table 3. The R&D activities of HM China even now are not much 
different from what they were in 2002.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Like HM China entered with Sonata series, GM China from the market entry focused 
exclusively on Buick series until 2005 (see Table 6). Working on Buick, SAIC-GM obtained 
some know-how about the products that the Chinese consumers wanted and, from 2005, 
SAICGM introduced more diversified product models including Chevrolet, LaCrosse, 
Cadillac, and some hybrid cars. SAIC-GM changed models frequently with technical updates. 
Buick, for example, went through 13 times of model changes. In this regard, SAIC-GM has 
promptly responded to the changing needs of consumers.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In addition to product-design R&D, localization of supply technology has been the key issue 
in determining MNCs. business networking with the key business actors. Table 6 illustrates 
the changes of policy in the automobile industry required by the Chinese government. 
Despite different contents and approaches, the goal has been very clearly manifested, which 
is replacement of imported technology with indigenous technology. Thus, the MNCs with a 
higher level of localization have been regarded as more beneficial to China. As the automaker 
MNCs settled down in the Chinese market, their understanding of the local market enhanced. 
The MNCs expanded local procurement and, as a result, the degree of local content 
substantially increased over time.  
 
Nonetheless, even among the MNCs, the levels of reliance on the foreign suppliers or on the 
Chinese suppliers have been different. A characteristic entry of HM was transplantation of 
the Korean automobile manufacturing system in China. With several long-term suppliers 
brought from HM in Korea plus the non-Chinese suppliers already in China, HM China 
constructed a supplier cluster. Table 7 illustrates the changes of HM China.s business 
networking in terms of suppliers.  
 
All MNCs selected suppliers through the bidding system, as has been mandated by the 
Chinese law. In the HM case, despite the more localized supplies, the Chinese suppliers were 
not systematically controlled or managed due to the large monitoring costs. As a result, the 
roles of Hyundai Mobis China, a wholly-owned subsidiary, never atrophied. The 
clusterization with Hyundai Mobis China enabled HM China to speed up the foreign entry 
and to maintain product quality. Table 7 shows the changing picture of business networking 
in terms of supplier relationship. In 2003, HM China had 47 foreign (mainly Korean) and 13 
Chinese suppliers; in 2010, the foreign and the Chinese suppliers increased to 86 and 70 
firms, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 7here] 
 
Localization of HM China focused on the minor changes of product design originally 
developed in Korea plus the marketing-based search targeting the local consumers and the 
local regulations. Accordingly, the core component supplies were manufactured by Hyundai 
Mobis China while other supplies were produced by the Chinese suppliers in a mode of 
highly detailed control. The successful internationalization of HM in the Chinese market 
largely relied on the quick replication of the Korean production system in the setting of 
China, supported by the group structure. Because of the entry strategy and underdevelopment 
of the general supplier network in China, co-development between BAIC-HM and the 
Chinese suppliers rarely occurred.  
 
Unlike BAIC-HM, DF-Citroen did not accompany the rank of suppliers when entering China. 
It was because Citroen entered very early and it was too costly to bring the core component 
suppliers from France. The firm established a base of suppliers in China, which produced 
mainly completely-knock down (CKD) and semi-knock down (SKD) parts to Citroen China. 
In so doing, DF-Citroen also raised production localization up to 80 percent in 2010 from 
56% in 2004. During the early stage of production, the firm relied on the partner.s suppliers. 
Yet Citroen China began to acquire the local suppliers and gradually substituted the supplier 
base (which consisted of partner suppliers) with the Citroen affiliates. DF-Citroen thereby 
increased localization ratio required by the Chinese government. At our interview, DF was 
concerned that Citroen, infavor of the affiliates (and thus Citroen China itself), maintained 
transfer price too high and insisted on procurement from the Citroen China affiliates.  
 
Because Citroen China was not pre-clustered at the entry and was an early entrant, its 
business networking with suppliers was different from HM China. Most notably, it had 
enough time to build business networking with the Chinese suppliers. As Table 7 shows, DF-
Citroen had a larger supplier base than BAIC-HM or SAIC-GM; nonetheless, it remained less 
localized (in terms of localization ratio) than others.  
 
Compared to Citroen, the official entry of GM was delayed for five years. In contrast to HM, 
GM entered without a supplier network and therefore heavily relied on SAIC for supplier 
selection. In fact, building a supplier base in a host country itself was not a concern for GM 
China. Because GM also operated the subsidiary in Korea, it was not worried about 
unavailability of core suppliers in China. Rather, the issue was how to show a commitment to 
the partner with localization. GM China thus left supplier selection to SAIC. Instead of direct 
controls, the firm exercised indirect controls in a way that it replaced suppliers if they failed 
to meet required quality and prices.  
 
Accordingly, GM and SAIC maintain a close relationship through SAIC-GM, perhaps closer 
than GM-Daewoo, a Korean subsidiary of GM. The close relationship enabled GM China to 
operate the extensive sales network after its entry. GM China also admits that such a fast 
increase in dealership has been contributed to active assistance from SAIC and has 
augmented its sales performance. As Table 8 suggests, SAIC-GM is active in expanding sales 
and distribution networking with dealers. The dealership of SAIC-GM doubled over seven 
years. BAIC-HM, despite the smaller number, increased more rapidly than SAIC-GM. The 
network expansion of DF-Citroen was the slowest among our three cases.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Scholars in international business have been concerned with a question that how network 
relationships and local knowledge affect the performances of MNCs. international operations 
(Vahlne et al. 2010; Elg et al. 2008). Networking is considered as a determinant of the 
performance for international market entry. In this study, we have treated networking as an 
antecedent to internationalization process, and have examined how MNCs. speed of 
internationalization is related to networking specifically in the context of emerging markets. 
While MNCs. relational management has attracted attentions, speed of entry in emerging 
markets has been almost ignored. We have selected the automobile market in China as our 
research setting because, in order to enter the Chinese automobile market, having good 
relationship with both central government and local governments, in addition to business 
actors is very important (Ghauri and Holstius, 1996). In addition, the rapid growth of the 
automobile industry in China sufficiently presents motivations for MNCs to maintain 
business networking with the key local actors, to be successful.  
 
The previous studies have identified entry timing and pre-clusterization entry strategy as 
important variables related to internationalization process, while we explore the impact of 
networking on internationalization process (Gomes-Lasseres, 1994; Guillen, 2003). 
Regarding entry timing, early entry may offer "first-mover advantage"in relations with 
important local business actors but can also lower survival likelihood if mutual understanding 
between MNCs and local business actors is not sufficient. Pre-clusterization entry minimizes 
trial-and-error costs in entry process and institutes core competence in home country in the 
foreign market setting, enabling MNCs to expand the boundary of business networking 
within a short time.  
 
Our findings show that entry process was significantly influenced by networking with the key 
local actors and that early entry provides a good opportunity to develop relationships with 
key business actors. Our study also reveals that the Chinese automobile market, 
preclusterization strategy facilitated the networking and the speed of entry. Both pre-
clusterization strategy and network relationship with local actors affected the level of MNCs. 
Resource commitments and local learning. This confirms earlier studies such as Buckley and 
Ghauri(2004) and Johanson and Vahlne(1977 and 2009).  
 
Our study makes considerable contribution towards existing knowledge on networking and 
how it influences internationalization process, as it reveals that networking facilitates initial 
market entry as well as subsequent internationalization process. For example, HM established 
more rapidly due to efficient networking and strong commitment to the local market, while 
GM entry was delayed for 5 years due to inefficient networking and Citroen took the longest 
time to enter the market and showed lowest profit due to the same reasons.  
 
For managerial implication, our study provides some guidelines to foreign firms entering 
emerging markets, particularly China. It shows that networking with local and central 
government is crucial in the entry process and how it can speed up the entry process. 
Moreover, it shows that local government in emerging markets value long-term commitment 
and technology transfer beyond product or production technology and that long-term 
commitment are valued more. For example, Hyundai seems to achieve the fastest market 
entry as it showed stronger commitment to the local market. It increased the local suppliers 
from 13 firms in 2003 to 70 firms in 2010 and transferred production technology from Korea 
to China right from the start. HM transferred Korean manufacturing system in China and 
created a supplier cluster/network. Citroen on the other hand did not bring in any technology 
to be transferred to the supplier at the time of entry. HM has also been very good in 
understanding consumers in China and adapting its products accordingly as compared to the 
other two MNCs.  
 
Finally, our study has its limitations as we study only automobile industry and the findings 
cannot be generalized to other industries.  
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